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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Record discloses that Respondent Michael Horn ("Horn") was a "fly-by-night" 
contractor who arrived in Teton County as a semi-retired airline and Air Force pilot. Horn formed 
Frontier Development Group, LLC ("FDG"), registered an assumed business name as "Open Range 
Homes," and held himself out as "the best builder" in the area- all despite not having any actual 
experience in construction. Horn built a total of nine homes over a few short years, which were built 
entirely by subcontractors. When the Appellants Louis and Patricia Caravella ("Caravellas") began 
to litigate with Horn, he moved to Florida where he resumed his career as a pilot. The condition and 
quality of the work performed on the home purchased by the Caravellas fully established Horn's 
absolute incompetence. (Findings #92-112, Conclusions #39.) After engaging in such conduct, 
Horn seeks to hide behind the LLC he created for the purpose of engaging in the work he had no 
business conducting. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Throughout his opening brief, Horn points to bits of evidence that are contrary to the findings 
of fact made by the Court. Caravellas are compelled to address such contentions by contrasting 
Horn's assertions to this Court with the district court's actual findings and/or citations to the Record. 
1. The initial owner of the property for whom Horn started construction on the home 
was Rick Myers ("Myers), a non-party to this action. Mr. Myers never testified at a trial or 
deposition in this matter. Horn cites to "Defendants' Exhibit HHHH" for the assertion that Myers 
directed FDG to reduced "numerous construction line items and transfer funds to other areas of the 
Project," and that the modifications were approved by First Horizon. Hom's assertion is problematic 
because the simple citation to "Exhibit HHHH" is wholly inadequate to direct the Court to any 
specific evidence. Exhibit HHHH consists of the deposition transcript of First Horizon's 
representative, Theresa Nichols (Exhibit HHHH-1), as well as a vast number of exhibit pages 
(Exhibit HHHH-2). Second, the district court expressly found with regard to this issue that despite 
Hom's assertion of those "facts," there was no evidence to support any such transfers or approval 
from First Horizon except for about $7,000 worth of cabinets. (Findings #12-25,52 and 55.) 
2. Hom cites his own testimony regarding changes to the construction plans, but the 
district court expressly found his testimony to be predicated upon hearsay and did not give it much, 
if any, weight. (Findings #51-55.) Further, the district court expressly found that Hom and the 
Caravellas agreed that the home would be constructed in accordance with the original written plans, 
not the modified plans that Hom attributed to Myers. (Findings #55.) 
3. Hom asserts that when construction ended for Myers all the building materials that 
had been delivered but not yet installed was left on the property, but Hom fails to cite the Record om 
support of his assertion. The district court expressly found to the contrary, that Hom had billed for 
and was paid tens of thousands of dollars for work and materials that were not completed or 
installed, nor later found on the property. (Findings #12-25, 137.) At trial, Hom claimed that the 
funds for nearly all those items of work and materials had been shifted to other portions of the 
project, but the records submitted to the bank clearly showed that, with one exception regarding 
cabinets mentioned above, no such reapportionment occurred. (Findings #12-25.) Hom points out 
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that there were no findings regarding whether Myers, First Horizon or any ofthe subcontractors had 
reclaimed or sold uninstalled materials after construction halted, however, that there was no evidence 
that any of those things had occurred and thus no possibility for such a Finding. Indeed, it would 
not have been proper for any subcontractors to reclaim any items, because the evidence at trial was 
that all the subcontractors were paid in full. The only mechanics lien arising from the work done for 
Myers was belatedly filed by Hom, apparently once he knew the Caravellas' later purchase of the 
property would immediately pay his wrongful lien out of the closing funds. (Defs Ex. ZZZ.) 
4. Hom cites his own testimony (Tr. Vol. I, p. 246-47) that another contractor worked 
on the property to get the house into a saleable stage. The testimony he cites, however, is based upon 
the same type of hearsay otherwise rejected by the district court, as discussed above. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
246:24-247: 13.) Hom's personal observations of the supposed work by the other contractors lacks 
any specificity, merely stating that "we saw people over there performing work." (Id. at247: 13-16.) 
The only specific work later described by Hom was that the other contractor "did some Tyvek work," 
and explained that Tyvek was missing "due to high winds and exposure to elements that that house 
suffered during that time period." (Id. at p. 248:23-249:7.) 
5. Hom points out that the property had passed the first two inspections, and asserts "it 
was determined that the property was structurally sound." The inspection records show only 
minimal inspections of the concrete footings and the "first half' of the foundation. (PI's Ex. 2.) 
There were never any defects found in the concrete subcontractor's work, although the building 
contractor (HornlFDG) had failed to properly secure the house to the foundation and failed to 
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properly utilize the foundation to support the center of the home, resulting in significant sagging of 
the interior floor. (Findings #95-96; Tr. Vol. II, p. 684: 17-685: 16, 692: 17 -693:4.) 
6. Hom misstates the district court's Finding #47. It does not state that Mr. Caravella 
had "extensive background in the professional world of real estate," nor does it state that he had a 
"wide range of experience in managing construction projects." In its entirety, Finding #47 states: 
Dr. Caravella testified to having significant knowledge and 
experience working with builders and contractors on construction 
management issues. He testified about prior projects, including a 
commercial/professional building related to his medical practice. The 
Court finds that Dr. Caravella's experience makes him a more 
sophisticated purchaser than the average homebuyer. (Emphases 
added.) 
7. Hom refers to an email marked as Plaintiff s Exhibit 16, but he fails to disclose to the 
Court that Exhibit 16 ultimately was not admitted into evidence. (Tr. Vol. L pp. 265-269.) A 
significant discussion regarding the status of Exhibit 16 is provided in the arguments below. In 
short, Hom failed to provide the proper foundation for Exhibit 16 and it is of no evidentiary value. 
8. Hom points out that the purchase and sale agreement between Caravellas and Myers 
indicate that Caravellas were purchasing the property "as is." Hom fails to point out, however, that 
the district court expressly found that the "as is" clause had no application to the builder's liability 
for construction defects, and thus had no bearing whatsoever on the claims against Hom and FDG. 
(Conclusions #37.) 
9. Hom cites to page 40 ofMr. Caravellas' deposition, (PI's Ex. 97), and asserts that 
Caravella had relied on his own expertise in performing the inspection of the subject property. In 
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reality, the testimony from his deposition clearly states that Caravellas relied on Hom's opinions. 
(ld. at p. 39:23-40:9.) The district court expressly concluded that "the record is clear that the 
Caravellas relied heavily upon Hom's representations as to the condition of the home. In lieu of 
bringing in an outside inspector, Caravellas relied upon the builder [Hom] who would be completing 
the home to confirm its condition." (Conclusions #37, p. 354.) The Court's finding is supported by 
the Caravellas' testimony. (Tr. Vol I., p. 37:6-17;Tr. Vol. II, pp. 884:6-15, 887:10-25, 893:3-5, 
896:7-897:5.) 
10. Hom asserts that the parties had agreed to a "cost plus arrangement with a 12% fee 
for Hom's services," and that Hom was authorized to phase the project however he wanted. This 
description, however, is similar to Hom's version of the agreement that was wholly rejected in the 
court's findings and conclusions. The court expressly found that it was a fixed price contract that 
was to be completed in specific phases. (Findings # 57, 60 and 61 ;Conclusions #26.) The district 
court cited several references to the Record in support of its Findings. Since these facts are critical 
to the Caravellas award of damages against FDG for breach of contract, they cannot be disturbed on 
appeal because Hom has not appealed from that judgment. 
11. Hom claims that the district court never found that he had done anything improper 
with regard to Myers and First Horizon, but that simply is not true. The court found multiple 
instances of billing for work and material that was never installed or completed, (Findings # 12-25), 
and expressly declared that "FDG and Hom's prior dealings with Myers and First Horizon also show 
a pattern of billing for materials that were never used in constructing the home." (Findings #137). 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Hom incorrectly states the standard of review as to all the issues on appeal. While the fraud 
claims against Hom must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the claims regarding his 
liability as the agent for an undisclosed principal and to pierce the corporate veil must be proven only 
by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court recently explained the standard in such cases: 
We review a district court's bench trial decisions to determine 
"whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the 
findings offact support the conclusions of law." Independence Lead 
Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409, 413 
(2006). This Court will set aside findings of fact only when clearly 
erroneous. Id. We will not disturb findings supported by substantial 
and competent evidence, "even if the evidence is conflicting." Id. "It 
is the province of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and 
testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Thorn 
Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 137 Idaho 480, 484,50 P.3d 975, 979 
(2002). We, therefore, liberally construe a trial court's findings "in 
favor of the judgment entered." ld. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). When it comes to matters of law, however, we are not 
bound by the trial court's conclusions; this Court is free to "draw its 
own conclusions from the facts presented." !d. 
Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, 151 Idaho 761, 768 (Idaho 2011). 
B. HORN IS PERSONALLY LIABLE BECAUSE HE ENTERED THE CONTRACT 
WITH CARA VELLAS AS THE AGENT FOR AN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL 
1. Horn Relies on a Document That Ultimately Was Not Admitted into Evidence. 
Hom relies heavily on Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 throughout his brief, citing references to "Open 
Range Homes," as well as with regard to $20,000 allegedly owed by Myers to Hom. Such reliance 
is improper, however, because Exhibit 16 ultimately was not admitted into evidence. At trial, 
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Caravellas objected to the admission of Exhibit 16, because it had not been previously produced in 
discovery. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 265:18-23.) Ultimately, the district court conditionally admitted Exhibit 
16 subject to HornlFDG's ability to establish by the end of trial that the document was produced in 
discovery. (Id. at p. 266-269.) The district court clearly explained: "If by the end oftrial you can't 
establish that, then it will no longer be admitted." (Id. at 266: 13-18) (emphasis added); (See also, 
Id. at 269:5-7 ("Exhibit 16 is provisionally admitted subject to verification that it was provided in 
discovery.").) Importantly, there was no later mention of Exhibit 16 at trial and HornlFDG never 
provided any verification that the document had been produced in discovery. Even on the third day 
oftrial, when the parties stipulated to admission of several exhibits, there was no reference made to 
the contested Exhibit 16. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 669:13-672:7.) 
Therefore, under the district court's ruling on the evidence, Exhibit 16 was "no longer 
admitted," and thus cannot be used to support or challenge any findings of fact. The exclusion of 
Exhibit 16 from evidence adequately explains why the district court made no reference to Exhibit 
16 in its decision. More telling is the fact that HornlFDG did not make a single reference to Exhibit 
16 in their written closing argument or proposed findings and conclusions, despite its overt reference 
to Open Range Homes. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Caravellas ever received the email contained in 
Exhibit 16, and Caravellas dispute the authenticity of the document. The document is purported to 
be an email addressed to Mark Griese, the realtor with whom the Caravellas were working. 
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Caravellas purportedly received the email as a "cc" in the email to Griese. 1 A simple comparison 
of the Exhibit 16 email with every other email submitted into evidence by HornlFDG shows a key 
distinction that demonstrates a lack of authenticity. The email heading indicates that it was from 
"Michael Hom [builder@openrangehomes.com]," but merely indicates that it was sent to "Louis 
Caravella." In every other email submitted by Plaintiffs, comprising at least 70 separate exhibits, 
(PI's Exhibits 10-14, 18-33, 35-40, 42-81 and 85-87), the headings for email correspondence 
between the Caravellas and Hom either expressly include the Caravellas' full email address, 
"twoiz4u@msn.com," or they show Louis Caravella's name in single-quotation marks, i.e., 'Louis 
Caravella', indicating that it was an assigned name for an actual email address. The email in Exhibit 
16 is the only one in all of HornlFDG' s multitude of email exhibits that lacks either the single-
quotation marks or a full reference to the actual email address. Not only was the document never 
produced in discovery, raising more doubt as to its authenticity, it amazingly and conveniently 
touches on nearly every factual point needed to plug the holes in HornlFDG's case against the 
Caravellas, as demonstrated by the numerous citations to Exhibit 16 in their appellate brief. 
2. Horn Had the Burden at Trial to Establish that the Limited Liability Company 
was Disclosed to Caravellas Before Entering Into the Contract. 
a. The District Court Improperly Applied the Burden of Proof. 
The district court erred in focusing upon a lack of evidence that Hom actively attempted to 
hide FDG's role in the transaction. Rather, the court should have focused upon whether Hom had 
1 Mr. Griese was not called as a witness at trial, and thus never confirmed that he ever 
received the email, either. 
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actively attempted to disclose FDQ's role. In his response brief, Hom wholly ignores and presents 
no opposing argument against this important aspects of the Caravellas' argument. 
Hom's assertion that he was acting as an agent for a disclosed principal is an unpleaded 
affirmative defense for which he bore the burden of proof at trial. Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. 
Corp., 98 Idaho 678, 681, 570 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Idaho 1977); Marco Distributing, Inc. v. Biehl, 97 
Idaho 853, 858, 555 P.2d 393, 398 (1976). 
Further, it is well settled that the burden is on the agent to adequately disclose the principal's 
role in the transaction prior to entering into the contract ifhe wishes to avoid personal liability, not 
the duty ofthe other party to discover the principal's role. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) Agency § 
6.03, cmt. 3 ("The third party is not subject to a duty to discover the principal's existence or identity; 
the responsibility is the agent's if the agent wishes to avoid personal liability on the contract."); 
Interlode Constructors v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 446-447,974 P.2d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he 
managing officer of a corporation, even though acting for the company, becomes liable as a principal 
where he deals with one ignorant of the company's existence and of his relation to it and fails to 
inform the latter of the facts."); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 
Idaho 691,697,535 P.2d 664,670 (1975) ("A principal is 'disclosed' if, at the time of making the 
contract in question, the other party to it has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the 
principal's identity."); Western Seeds v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70, 71,704 P.2d 974, 975 (Ct. App. 1985) 
("An agent contracting with someone else is liable as a party to the contract unless he discloses, at 
or before the time of entering into the contract, the agency relationship and the identity of the 
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principal."); Welch v. Laraway, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3041, at 10 (Bankr. D. Idaho Sept. 13,2010) 
(Attached to Caravellas' Opening Brief as Addendum 1) ("The party asserting agency as a defense 
to personal liability on a contract bears the burden of showing that the principal was adequately 
disclosed. "). 
Therefore, as an affirmative defense, Hom had the burden to prove that he disclosed to the 
Caravellas "at or before the time of entering into the contract" that he was acting on behalf ofFDG, 
and the Caravellas had no duty to discover the existence ofFDG as the true contracting party. The 
district court erred in switching the burden of proof to Caravellas by focusing on the lack of evidence 
that Hom had actively attempted to hide FDG's connection to the agreement. Because the burden 
was on Hom, and there was no evidence that Hom made any attempt to disclose FDG's role to the 
Caravellas, Hom made no adequate disclosure and should be found personally liable. 
b. The District Court Erred by Relying upon Horn's Email Address, 
Signage at the Job Site and Subsequent Invoices in Concluding That 
FDG Was Properly Disclosed. 
There are three facts cited by the district court and Hom regarding whether FDG' s connection 
was disclosed to the Caravellas: Hom's email address, signage at the job site, and subsequent 
invoices emailed to the Caravellas after the contract was made and work had begun. Only the email 
address and signage at the job site existed before the contract was entered. 
1. Subsequent Invoices From FDG. 
The subsequent invoices are irrelevant to whether or not FDG was disclosed "at or before the 
time of entering into the contract," because they were not delivered until after work had begun under 
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the contract. Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975; General Motors Acceptance Corp., 
96 Idaho at 697, 535 P.2d at 670. Thus, the invoices from FDG do not relieve Hom as the agent 
from liability under the contract. 
The district court incorrectly found and concluded that because the Caravellas continued to 
pay FDG' s invoices, they "essentially acquiesced to the arrangement," and that the Caravellas "could 
have terminated the relationship early on because the project was clearly intended to be divided into 
separate and distinct phases." (Findings #162, p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359.) This finding fails 
to account for the court's other specific findings that no part of the approved first phase was ever 
completed. The parties agreed that Hom needed to repair the structural issues and complete the 
exterior of the home to enclose and protect it from weather "as soon as possible" for the first phase. 
(Findings #57, p. 329.) Caravellas initially authorized Hom to complete the "structural framing, 
ridge vents (roof) and exterior stone for $50,000," and to complete the "exterior wrap and pre-stained 
siding for $35,000. (Findings #58, p. 329.) Importantly, the court expressly found that none of those 
tasks were ever completed. (Findings #66-67, 70, 71 and 73, p. 330-31.) Thus, not a single part of 
the initial "separate and distinct phase" was ever completed, and Hom clearly remained liable as the 
contracting party. 
11. Email address and signage. 
The only facts identified by the district court or Hom that allegedly support a finding that 
FDG had been adequately disclosed to the Caravellas before entering into the agreement were Hom's 
email address and signage at the job site. (Findings #161-63; Conclusion #59.) At most, those 
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indicators ofFDG' s role were merely available for the Caravellas to discover before the contract was 
formed. As argued above, the Caravellas had no duty to discover FDG's role, rather, Hom had a 
duty to disclose it. While Mr. Caravella testified that he was aware -at least by the time of the 
trial- that the email address through which he had corresponded with Hom was 
"builder@openrangehomes.com," there was no evidence that Mr. Caravella ever paid any attention 
to the email address at that time. There also was no evidence that Mr. Caravella discemed- solely 
from the email address-thatHomwasactingasanagentforFDG.Mr. Caravella consistently 
testified that he believed he was sending emails to Mr. Hom. (Tr. Vol I., pp. 59:24-61:21, and 
88: 18-21.) As argued in the Caravellas' opening brief, and unopposed by Hom in his brief, the use 
of a particular email domain name cannot be sufficient notice that the sender of the email is acting 
as an agent for any business operating under the same name, just as a person using an "msn.com" 
or "yahoo. com" address does not imply an agency relationship with MSN or Yahoo. This is 
particularly true in light of the agent's burden to adequately disclose the principal. In this case, the 
email address did not even include the actual name of the company, but only an assumed business 
name, making it even more difficult for the Caravellas to discover FDG's role. 
Neither the signage on the jobsite nor any clear picture of the signage was ever introduced 
into evidence. Hom testified, however, that the sign was placed on the job site when he began work 
for Myers in 2006. Hom described what was on the sign: "That particular sign said Open Range 
Custom Homes, but then gave !l!J!. phone number and e-mail address, which was 
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builde1@openrangehomes.com." (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 235:18-236:13) (emphases added).2 Horn 
confirmed that the same sign, was left on the property until December 2008. (ld. at p. 237: 12-18.) 
Thus, the name on the sign is not the same name that is registered with the Idaho Secretary of State 
as an assumed business name for FDG. The assumed business name filed by FDG is "Open Range 
Homes"; it is not "Open Range Custom Homes." (PI's Exhibit 90.) The Idaho Assumed Business 
Names Act requires that "[a] separate certificate of assumed business name must be filed for each 
assumed business name a person uses." Idaho Code § 53-504(2) (emphasis added).3 Therefore, 
the name on the sign-which is directly connected with the email address and phone number used 
by Horn-fails to provide any notice of a connection with FDG. 
Even ifthe Caravellas "should have" seen the sign, as the district court concluded, (Findings 
#161), they could not have made a connection between "Open Range Custom Homes" and FDG. 
Additionally, if the Caravellas had seen the sign, they could reasonably have concluded that the 
email address used by Horn was associated with "Open Range Custom Homes" rather than the 
2 A partially-legible picture ofthe sign is included under Tab 9 of Exhibit HHHH-2, 
designated by bates-stamp as page FHHL-000063. The words "Open Range" are partially 
visible. The next line down on the sign is illegible, yet appears to be longer than only the word 
"Homes," and could be long enough to state "Custom Homes." The house is not in the 
background, so it is impossible to determine its location. Since the picture was taken during the 
Myers project, it does not indicate the sign's condition when the Caravellas visited the property. 
3 The term "person" includes a formally organized or registered entity. Idaho Code § 53-
503(5). The term "Formally organized or registered entity" includes limited liability companies. 
Idaho Code § 53-503(2). 
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assumed business name for FDG. This discrepancy serves only to increase Hom's obligation to 
affinnatively disclose the role ofFDG. 
Furthennore, as addressed in Caravellas' opening brief, there was no evidence regarding 
where the sign was placed, how big it was, or whether it was even legible after being out in the 
elements for nearly two years. The partially-legible picture referenced in footnote 2, supra, clearly 
shows that the sign was not located in front of the house. Hom has presented no argument nor 
identified any such facts in the Record. The Caravellas testified that they did not see the sign. 
(Findings #45.) Testimony concerning the mere existence of a sign on the property (which they have 
no duty to look for) is insufficient evidence to satisfy Hom's burden to prove his unpleaded 
affinnative defense that FDG' s role was adequately disclosed to Caravellas. See Welch v. Laraway, 
2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3041 (Bankr. D. Idaho Sept. 13,2010) (holding that identifying the name ofthe 
company on plans and specifications given to the buyers, and posting of the company's contractor 
license in the office visited by the buyers, was insufficient to establish notice that the buyers were 
dealing with a corporation, rather than the company's owner.) 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FDG WAS AN 
"ALTER EGO" OF HORN AND "PIERCED THE CORPORATE VEIL" 
Hom seeks to hide behind the fiction of an LLC he created for the purpose of engaging in the 
work he had no business conducting. He asserts that his purchase of two forklifts, only one of which 
was still owned when he did the work for Caravellas, was adequate capitalization for the LLC. The 
LLC owned no other assets. (Exhibit DDDD, Hom Deposition, P. 230, L. 11-19.) There was no 
evidence regarding the forklift's value or whether it was subject to a lien. 
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Hom argues there was no evidence that he co-mingled funds with FDG, and misconstrues 
the actual testimony on the issue. Hom's testimony demonstrates that he simply used the company's 
income as his own, rather than receiving any kind of salary or distribution: 
Q- Did you pay yourself as the managing member from Frontier 
Development? 
A- J did not receive a salary per se. You'd have to clarifY your 
question. 
Q- How did you -- did you cut separate checks from Frontier 
Development to pay yourself or did you just take dividends or how 
did you accomplish it? 
A - I didn't really take an income out of the company itself. It was just 
income coming in and then -- no, I didn't pay myself out of Frontier 
Development Group, no. 
Q- So you didn't cut a separate managing member's salary or 
anything like that? It's just whatever money came in and was left over 
at the end you -- was your income? 
A- Yes. 
(Tr. Vol. II, P. 910, L. 1-23) (emphasis added). For these, and the reasons expressed in Caravellas' 
opening brief, Caravellas respectfully submit that there was a unity of interest between Horn and 
FDG that, under the circumstances, supports piercing of the corporate veil to establish Horn's 
personal liability to pay the Caravellas' judgment against FDG. 
D. THE CARA VELLAS PROVED FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE 
The district court concluded that the Caravellas proved eight of nine elements of fraud with 
regard to the following categories of misrepresentations: 
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a. the condition, quality and value of the Horne and workmanship of the 
construction performed on the Horne before they purchased it; 
b. the progress and quality of work FDG performed on the project 
pursuant to his contract with them; and 
c. the cost of materials used in the construction. 
(Conclusions #42) (emphases added). The only element not found by the district court was the 
scienter element, "the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth." Despite Hom's 
contention that modem case law requires that scienter be proven only by "the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity," the alternative means of proving scienter (the speaker's ignorance of its truth) has 
often been recognized by this Court. See, e.g., Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 389, 613 P.2d 
1338, 1340 (1980) (emphasis added). Accord, e.g., Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 
Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449,453 (2005); Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 
Idaho 84, 89, 996 P.2d 303, 308 (2000); and Zuhlke v. Anderson Buick, Inc., 94 Idaho 634, 635, 496 
P.2d 95,96 (1972). "Circumstances inconsistent with an honest, reasonable belief in the truth of 
the statements, or indicating a reckless disregard for the truth" are sufficient to establish the scienter 
element of fraud. Parker v. Herron, 30 Idaho 327,331,164 P. 1013, 1014 (1917). See also, e.g., 
General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 854,979 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1999) (in 
punitive damages context, describing "reckless indifference to the rights ofthe other party" as fraud). 
As cited in the Caravellas' opening brief, federal courts, other state courts, Am Jur 2d and 
the Restatements all provide for proof of the scienter element of fraud where the speaker makes a 
statement in reckless disregard for the truth, i.e., knowing that the speaker has no basis for the 
representation. For example, at 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 120 (2012), it is explained that 
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False statements that are made recklessly, without knowing or caring 
whether they are true or false, will support an action of fraud or 
deceit. Accordingly, the scienter or intent to deceive requirement, for 
purposes of a fraud claim, can be satisfied by a showing of 
recklessness. A representation is 'reckless' ifit is made without any 
knowledge of the truth, or if the person making the representation 
knows that he or she does not have sufficient information or a basis 
to support it, or if the maker realizes that he or she does not know 
whether or not the statement is true. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphases added). The Caravellas proved facts, that were found by the 
district court, which demonstrate that Hom either knew his statements were false or, if not, that he 
obviously made the representations despite his "ignorance of its truth." Paw v. Greenwood, 101 
Idaho at 389, 613 P.2d at 1340. Hom's indifference and reckless disregard for the actual truth 
requires a conclusion that he made misrepresentations to the Caravellas with "knowledge of its 
falsity or in ignorance of its truth." ld. 
In their opening brief, the Caravellas identified numerous findings and conclusions made by 
the district court that establish the scienter element of fraud. Hom contends that the district court 
may have applied the wrong evidentiary standard, by asserting that the Caravellas had not proven 
the scienter element offraud by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing 
evidence. The findings and conclusions relied upon by the Caravellas are supported by the district 
court's citations to clear and convincing evidence in the Record. Because there is substantial 
competent evidence to support the finding, then there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support such finding by the clear and convincing evidence standard. Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 
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702, 707, 8 P. 3d 1245, 1250 (2000); Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 225, 46 P.3d 518, 521 
(2002). 
1. False Statements Regarding Value Condition, Quality and Workmanship 
The district court's finding that Hom had represented to Caravellas that $800,000 worth of 
construction had been completed is supported by Exhibit A. On the second page of the Exhibit, 
Hom explains that Myers had purchased the lot for $400,000. On the third page ofthe Exhibit he 
again states that the lot was woth $400,000 and that "approximately $1.2M was expended on the 
project. Given the potential $800K purchase price, the $400K lot is free so to speak." This clearly 
establishes a representation offact by Hom (the builder) that approximately $800,000 of construction 
was completed. Ifthe "[t]ypical bild cost on a 6000 SF house is $1.5M," as Hom represented in the 
email found on page 2 of Exhibit A, then the Caravellas would only need to spend approximately 
$700,000 to complete the home if $800,000 had already been expended. The Caravellas' 
understanding of those facts was expressed in their email to Hom on March 21, 2008. (Def's Ex. 
D, p. 4.) Mr. Caravella wrote: "If! am essentially getting the lot for free ... then the $799,000 that 
has already been spent on the house construction coupled with your $750,000 is over $1,550,000." 
(Id.) Hom did not correct the Caravellas' understanding of the amount expended on construction 
when he replied by. email, rather he wrote: "Sure-$750K is a reasonable figure," essentially 
confirming the Caravellas' understanding. (Def's Ex. D, p. 2.) The value to the Caravellas was in 
the amount of construction already completed because it had a direct correlation to the cost of 
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completing the home as designed. If less than the amount represented was actually expended on 
construction, that would mean the Caravellas would have to pay even more to complete the home. 
Hom asserts that his statements about the value of the home were only his opinion, not 
statements of fact. Hom's assertions about the amounts expended on the combination of 
construction and acquisition of the real property leave no room for opinion, and Hom's confirmation 
of the Caravellas' understanding regarding the amount expended on construction, in the context of 
the funds needed to complete construction, demonstrates that his statements were fact, not opinion. 
Furthermore, "where actual value is known and false statements are knowingly made with 
intention to deceive, and do deceive the parties to whom they are made, such statements constitute 
actionable fraud. Such statements are not expressions of opinion but are statements of material 
facts." Jordan v. Hunter, 124 Idaho 899, 907 (Ct. App. 1993), citing Fox v. Cosgrith, 66 Idaho 371, 
380, 159 P.2d 224, 227 (1945). "Thus, where a speaker gives an opinion when he is aware offacts 
incompatible with such opinion, the opinion may amount to a false statement of fact if made with 
the intention of deceiving or misleading." !d., citing Fox, 66 Idaho at 380-81,159 P.2d at 227-28; 
37 Am. Jm. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 49. As previously argued, Hom had absolutely no basis for his 
contention that either $800,000 worth of construction was completed, since he was the contractor 
who did the previous work and had only been paid about $656,173. (Findings # 12.) He also knew 
that around $87,000 of that amount was for work or materials that had never been performed or 
installed. (Findings 12-25.) Thus Hom's knowledge was wholly incompatible with any "opinion" 
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that $800,000 worth of construction had been completed, and clearly support the conclusion that 
Hom's statement was false. 
Hom further asserts that his assessment of the house as being in "good shape," "structurally 
sound," and a "great house," are statements of opinion, not fact. While asserting that something is 
a "great house" might be more of an opinion, an assertion that the house is "structurally sound" is 
more specific and implies knowledge on the part of the speaker regarding the actual structure of the 
horne. The assertion that it is in "good shape" is similar. This is particularly true given the context 
of the statements, i.e., statements by the person who should be most knowledgeable on the topics, 
the builder who built the house. Unbeknownst to the Caravellas, however, Hom had no skill or 
knowledge upon which to base any opinion regarding the structural soundness of the house, and 
should not have represented anything regarding its condition. The fact that Hom made substantial 
efforts to convince the Caravellas that he was the best builder in the Teton Valley adds extra weight 
to his representation regarding the structural integrity of the horne. 
Hom argues there is no evidence that he was actually aware of the poor workmanship and 
quality of the horne, being an incompetent "hands-off' contractor. Such lack of knowledge and skill 
should have dissuaded Hom from making any assertion regarding the condition of the horne. His 
choice to portray himself as a skilled, knowledgeable builder and to make representations of fact 
without having any actual knowledge renders his representations fraudulent. 
Hom further asserts that the district court made no finding that the Caravellas relied upon his 
representations after they personally visited the property, but that is incorrect. (See Findings #32, 
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43; Conclusions #37, 42.) These findings and conclusion are supported by the evidence. (Tr. Vol 
1., p. 37:6-17;Tr. Vol. II, pp. 884:6-15,887:10-25,893:3-5,896:7-897:5.) 
Hom also argues there was no express finding that Caravellas actually relied on Hom's 
statements regarding value, but the court did conclude that such reliance was made. (Conclusions 
#42.) This conclusion is supported by the Record. (Tr. Vol 1., p. 37:6-17;Tr. Vol. II, pp. 884:6-15, 
887:10-25,893:3-5,896:7-897:5.) 
Hom asserts that he had "zero financial interest in the transaction." This statement ignores, 
of course, the fact that his wife was the listing real estate agent who would receive a substantial 
commission from the sale of an $800,000 property. It further ignores the fact that he filed a lien for 
$23,000 on the property within 1 Yz hours after the counteroffer was signed and sent to the 
Caravellas. (Def's Ex. ZZZ.) Hom had the additional incentive in the likelihood that he, as the 
original builder who was discussing the home with the Caravellas, would be given the contract to 
finish the home. 
2. False Statements Regarding Progress and Quality of the Work. 
Hom's arguments regarding a lack of any "meeting of the minds" and his other assertions 
regarding the terms of the contract are contrary to those found by the district court, and thus are not 
properly raised as an issue on appeal. The district court concluded that a fixed price contract existed 
to complete specific items of work, that FDG had breached the contract, and awarded damages to 
the Caravellas. Hom's argument would require a reversal ofthe breach of contract damages awarded 
to Caravellas, and thus cannot be raised absent a cross-appeal. 
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Horn misstates the district court's findings regarding the completion of the stonework, 
flashing, ridge vents' and siding, asserting that the court found those items had been completed 
according to changes Myers had made to the plans. None of those findings, however, state that the 
work had been so completed, but merely state that Horn had made such claims. (Findings #66, 67 
and 71.) Importantly, the district court expressly found that the parties had agreed to construct the 
home according to the written plans, (Findings #55), and found Horn's assertions regarding changes 
purportedly made by Myers to be hearsay and lacking in credibility. (Findings #51-55.) Horn's 
argument regarding garage doors are contradicted by the district court's findings, and he does not 
support his assertions with any citations to the Record. 
3. False Statements Regarding Billing for Work Performed. 
Horn further misstates the district court's Finding ofF act #64 by asserting that the Caravellas 
had continually adjusted the authorized work and increased the contract price to over $124,000. 
There is no mention of that figure anywhere in Finding #64 nor any other Finding. Importantly, the 
Court found that none of the authorized work was ever completed. Ultimately, the district court 
found that even if the Caravellas had owed Horn nearly $20,000 for the defective, unauthorized 
concrete work, and over $16,000 for unauthorized garage doors, the most the Caravellas could 
possibly have owed Horn was $126,646. (Findings #82,128 and13 1.) The court, however, found 
that those amounts were not owed by the Caravellas and granted them damages for the full amount 
charged for the concrete and for a substantial portion of the amount charged for garage doors. 
(Conclusions #29-33.) Even if Horn believed those amounts were owed, the Caravellas had already 
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paid over $13 8,000, (Findings # 131), which was substantially greater than the maximum amount 
they could possibly have owed for the work completed. Additionally, Horn was seeking to collect 
another $105,000 through his mechanics lien foreclosure. 
Finally, Horn's argument regarding a cost plus contract should be rejected, because it would 
require a revision of the relief afforded the Caravellas for breach of contract, and Hom did not file 
a cross appeal. Furthermore, the district court's findings and conclusions regarding the fixed price 
contract is supported by the evidence. (Exhibit N.) 
E. SUBST ANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS THAT CARA VELLAS PROVED THE OTHER EIGHT 
ELEMENTS OF FRAUD 
Horn asserts that he can challenge the district court's findings and conclusions that Caravellas 
had proven the other eight elements offraud, despite the lack of a cross-appeal. While it is true that 
a party who prevailed on an issue can have that issue affirmed upon grounds not relied upon by the 
district court, however, the non-appealing party cannot obtain a reversal of facts or conclusions that 
would "change or add to the relief afforded below." Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 
993, 739 P.2d 290, 292 (1987). Hom failed to enumerate any specific additional issues on appeal 
in a statement of issues required under l.A.R. 35(b)(4). (See Respondents' Brief, p. 1-2.) A failure 
to enumerate an issue in the statement of issues ordinarily precludes consideration of the issue on 
appeal, Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P.2d 1166 (Ct. App. 1991), however, this rule might 
be relaxed if an additional issue is addressed by authorities cited or argument within the brief. 
Crown v. State Dept. of Agric., 127 Idaho 188,898 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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In this case, it is unclear from the arguments presented in Horn's brief exactly which 
additional elements are challenged with relation to each potential basis for fraud found by the district 
court. Accordingly, such additional issues challenging the district court's findings and conclusions 
regarding the other eight elements offraud should not be considered. Nevertheless, Caravellas have 
attempt to address what they perceive as challenges to the other elements of fraud in the above 
arguments regarding the specific areas of fraud. Because there is substantial and competent evidence 
to sustain the district court's findings pertaining to the other eight elements of fraud, this Court 
should affirm the district court on those issues. Sowards, 134 Idaho at 707, 8 P.3d at 1250; 
Lindberg, 137 Idaho at 225,46 P.3d at 52l. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Caravellas respectfully submit that the district court erred in failing to conclude that the 
Caravellas had proven all the elements of fraud against Horn by clear and convincing evidence. 
Caravellas also respectfully submit that Horn should have been found personally liable for the 
judgment awarded to Caravellas against FDG, as an alter ego. Finally, because Hom failed to 
disclose the role ofFDG in the transaction with Caravellas, he is liable under the contract as an agent 
for an undisclosed principal. Accordingly, Caravellas request that the district court be reversed on 
these issued, judgment entered in favor of the Caravellas against Horn personally, and that this Court 
award attorney fees on appeal. 
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